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COMMENTS

The Effect of Guardianship on Estate Plans
One responds to the certainty of death with dread and respect,
and one lays plans for the event. Few, however, admit or even think
of the possibility that they may become incompetent in their old
age; hence, provision is rarely made for this possibility in estate
plans. 1 The increased longevity resulting from the recent rapid
strides in medicine has as its corollary an increase both in the number of persons who become incompetent before death and the duration of their affliction. This poses a challenge to estate planners and
the law of guardianship.
When provision has not been made in an estate plan, a court
appointed guardian fills the need for some responsible person to care
for the incompetent's person and property.2 If such a guardian is
appointed as a guardian of the person, his duty is to attend to the
personal needs of the incompetent and prevent him from physically
harming himself and others.3 If he is appointed as a guardian of the
estate, on the other hand, his task is to manage the incompetent's
financial affairs. Although these two functions may be discharged
by the same person, it may be desirable that a different person undertake each responsibility. When an aged incompetent is no longer
able to care for himself, a relative may be the best person to look
after the incompetent's personal needs, but poorly equipped to manage the incompetent's financial affairs. A separate guardianship of
the estate by a person of good business judgment and fiduciary experience may therefore be desirable.
Today the guardianship of the person of an incompetent does
not present the law with many new problems; this comment, therefore, will be concerned exclusively with the problems associated with
the guardianship of an incompetent's estate.
I.

BACKGROUND

A concern for safeguarding minors early impressed itself on the
development of the American law of guardianship,4 and this orientation survives to this day. Since minors do not ordinarily have estate
I. See Zillgitt, Planning for Incompetency, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 181 (1964); Note,
Guardianship in the Planned Estate, 45 IowA L. REv. 360 (1960).
2. The leading authority in the area of guardianship is WOERNER, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP (1897) [hereinafter cited as WOERNER]. For more recent writings
see Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 983 (1966);
Symposium on Guardianship, 45 IowA L. R.Ev. 209 (1960).
3. See WOERNER §§ 47-52, 137-39; Fraser, Guardianship of the Person, 45 IowA L.
REV. 239 (1960).
4. See Fratcher, supra note 2, at 984.
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plans, it is not surprising that the law of guardianship does not speak
to the effect of guardianship on estate plans. This factor, plus the
very limited scope of preservative activities which present law allows
the guardian to pursue, renders the law of guardianship distinctly
unsuitable as applied to the aged incompetent, who may often have
an estate plan worked out to a fineness of detail rivaling the old English family property settlements. Increasingly, guardians find themselves faced with a conflict between effectively managing their ward's
estate, on the one hand, and respecting the plans that their wards
have made for disposing of their wealth, on the other.
American law assigns to the guardian a role of very limited scope.
His duties are largely the conservation of his ward's estate, the production of income from that estate, and the application of that income to his ward's needs. 5 Certain powers of a guardian, and of the
court supervising him, are fairly clear. The guardian, acting without
special court direction, may collect debts owed to his ward, 6 contract
for the ward's necessities (with a right of reimbursement from his
ward's estate),7 make short-term leases of real estate,8 and sell per5. See id. at 984-85.
6. Cox v. Williams, 241 Ala. 427, 3 So. 2d 129 (1941); Grant v. National Sur. Co.,
7 Alaska 179 (1924); ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 14-809 (1956); Suggs v. Valentine, 204 Ark.
86, 160 S.W.2d 890 (1942); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-627 (Supp. 1957); CAL. PRon. CoDlc:
§§ 1501, 1530a; Cole v. Jerman, 77 Conn. 374, 59 Atl. 425 (1904); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3921 (1953); First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1939); Carlton
v. Morgan, 68 Fla. 535, 67 So. 79 (1914); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1505 (1937); HAWAII REV.
LAws § 338-24 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1820 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 276,
293 (1963); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 5 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8.139 (1953); Jensen v.
Martinsen, 228 Iowa 307, 291 N.W. 422 (1940); IOWA CODE § 668.9 (1962); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-1804 (1964); KY. REv. STAT. § 387.130 (1962); Stockman v. City of So.
Portland, 147 Me. 376, 87 A.2d 679 (1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3 (1965);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 3505 (1965); Hamill v. Hamill, 162 Md. 159, 159 Atl. 247
(1932); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201, § 37 (1955); Reason v. Jones, 119 Mich. 672,
78 N.W. 899 (1899); MICH. Co'MP. LAws § 703.18 (1948); Patterson v. Melchoir, 102
Minn. 363, 113 N.W. 902 (1907); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.56 (Supp. 1966); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 440 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.130, 507.110 (1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 91-4902 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-502 (1943); NEV. REv. STAT. § 159.270 (1963);
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 462:4, :28 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-17 (1953); In the
Matter of Hynes, 105 N.Y. 560, 12 N.E. 60 (1887); Coggins v. Flythe, 113 N.C. 102,
18 S.E. 96 (1893); N.C. GEN: STAT. §§ 1-64, 33-20, -28 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30-14-06 (1943); Row v. Row, 53 Ohio 249, 41 N.E. 239 (1895); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2111.14 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 804 (1961); Murphy v. Whetstone,
96 Ore. 293, 188 Pac. 191 (1920); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1041 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 3401 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 35.2001 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-402
(1955); TEX. PRon. CODE ANN. §§ 230(b), 233 (1956); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1981
(1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-13-35 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2693, 2799 (1958);
Garland v. Norfolk Nat'l Bank, 156 Va. 653, 158 S.E. 888 (1931); VA. CODE ANN. § 37147 (1950); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 11.92.060 (Supp. 1956); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 319.23 (1957).
7. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502; In the Matter of Estate of Schluter, 209 Cal. 286,
286 Pac. 1008 (1930); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-301 (1961); Williams v. Vaughan, 363 Mo.
639, 253 S.W.2d 111 (1952); In the Matter of Vieweger, 93 N.J. Eq. 527, 117 Atl. 291
(Ch. 1922); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:18-3, :20-8 (1951); McCormick v. Shannon, 127 App.
Div. 745, Ill N.Y. Supp. 875 (1908); In the Matter of Roosevelt, 131 Misc. 800, 228
N.Y. Supp. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
8. Cole v. Jerman, 77 Conn. 374, 59 Atl. 425 (1904); Kinney v. Harrett, 46 Mich. 87,
8 N.W. 708 (1881); Martin v. Smith, 214 Minn. 9, 7 N.W.2d 481 (1942); N.J. REV, STAT,
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sonal property when necessary to meet the ward's expenses. 9 Outside
of these activities the guardian must apply to the supervising court
for authority to act. It is well settled that the guardian may not sell,
exchange, or mortgage real property without prior court approval. 10
As to other transactions, a rule frequently advanced to distinguish
between what a guardian may and may not do without court approval is expressed in terms of whether the guardian must make an
"election": 11 When the guardian must elect benveen clearly conflicting alternatives, he must seek court direction before making the decision.12 A guardian faces such an election, for example, when he must
decide whether his ward, a widow, should assert her dower rights to
her deceased husband's property, or take under his will. In practice,
however, it may often be difficult to decide what constitutes an election and what is simply a claim of right belonging to the ward.
The guardian's powers of investment, either with or without
court approval, are generally much more restricted than those of the
trustee,13 even though the guardian is under a duty to produce income from his ward's estate.14 Moreover, unlike a trustee or personal
representative, the guardian does not hold legal title to his ward's
property; consequently, a bona fide purchaser of property from a
guardian receives no legal title unless the guardian had lawful au§ 3A:16-l (1951); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 106(1); OHIO R.Ev. CODE § 2111.25 (Page
1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1062 (1950).

9. Cookson v. Louis Marx &: Co., 23 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); FLA. STAT. § 745.05
(1965); Hempstead v. Broad, 275 Ill. 358, 114 N.E. 120 (1916); Fletcher Trust Co. v.
Hines, 211 Ind. Ill, 4 N.E.2d 562 (1936); MICH COMP. LAws § 709.1 (1948); N.J. R.Ev.
STAT. § 3A:15-14 (1951); In re Collard, 8 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1948); OHIO REv. CoDE
ANN. § 2111.20 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1061 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 3441 (Supp. 1958).
10. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1530; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-238 (1960); GA. CODE
ANN. § 49-204 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 378 (Smith-Hurd Supp., 1966); MICH.
COMP. LAws § 709.3 (1948); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 106.
11. Where an incompetent has a personal privilege to elect between alternative
and inconsistent rights or claims, it has been held that the privilege does not pass
to the committee of the property of the incompetent. • • • A court of equity,
through its general jurisdiction over fiduciaries and its function of guardianship
of incompetents, may, in the proper case, direct the committee to act in behalf of
the incompetent ••••
In the Matter of Hills, 264 N.Y. 349, 353, 191 N.E. 12, 13 (1934); accord, Matter of
Brown, 212 App. Div. 677, 209 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1925).
12. Camardella v. Schwartz, 126 App. Div. 334, 110 N.Y. Supp. 611 (1908). See also
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Dais, 122 N.J. Eq. 182, 192 Atl. 849 (1937).
13. See Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. R.Ev.
264, 268-91 (1960).
14. ALA. CODE tit. 21, § 42 (1958); D.C. PROB. CT. R. 28, § 5, FLA. STAT. § 745.03
(1957); Hogshead v. State. 120 Ind. 327, 22 N.E. 330 (1889); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-134
(1953); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 192 (1957); MICH. COMP. LAws § 709.l (1948); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.56 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.190 (Supp. 1958); N.J. R.Ev.
STAT. § 3A:15-16 (1951); In the Matter of Staten Island Nat'! Bank &: Trust Co., 156
Misc. 330, 282 N.Y. Supp. 163 (Surr. Ct. 135); N.Y. Do111. REL. I.Aw § 85; Armstrong v.
Miller, 6 Ohio 118 (1833).

1616

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:1613

thority to sell the property.15 Furthermore, there are certain transactions which a guardian may not undertake even with court approval.
He may not, for example, lease his ward's real property if the lease
will run beyond the period of the guardianship.16 This rule was developed for the guardianship of minors, where the duration of the
guardianship is readily ascertainable, usually ending when the ward
reaches legal majority.17 In the case of the guardianship of incompetents, however, this rule makes anything but a short-term lease impossible.
The rule concerning leases is really a special application of the
broader rule that a guardian may not make contracts, except for necessities, which are binding on the ward.18 A guardian's contract may
be enforced against the guardian but not against the ward himself,
unless the ward affirms the contract after becoming competent.19
Moreover, a person who advances credit to the guardian for the
ward's benefit may not recover his debt from the ward's estate, unless he has first exhausted the personal resources of the guardian.20
This inability of a guardian to contract makes it nearly impossible
for him to conduct an existing business of his ward's. Furthermore,
in most states the supervision of guardians is vested in a court of
limited jurisdiction; 21 therefore, even when the guardian is acting
under a specific court directive, it is not always certain that the court
possesses the authority to authorize a particular transaction. The
practical result is that persons are wary of dealing with a guardian
in any matter, making it very difficult for the guardian to discharge
the duties of his office.
15. WOERNER § 53, at 173 n.2 and accompanying text; Fratcher, Powers and Duties
of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REv. 264, 291-92 (1960).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. WOERNER § 61.
18. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
19. Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal. 2d 367, 289 P.2d 16 (1955); Fay Improvement Co. v. DeBudge, 52 Cal. App. 695, 199 Pac. 819 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921); Rountree
v. Simmons, 56 Ga. App. 678, 193 S.E. 787 (1937); Greever v. Barker, 316 Mo. 308, 289
S.W. 586 (1926); Rhodes v. Frazier's Estate, 204 S.W. 547 (Mo. App. 1918); Coxe v.
Whitmire Motor Sales Co., 190 N.C. 838, 130 S.E. 841 (1925); Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N.D.
249, 83 N.W. 20 (1900); Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Ore. IO, 93 Pac. 696 (1908); Storey v.
Lonabaugh, 247 Pa. 331, 93 Atl. 481 (1915); Miller v. Vervena, 69 R.I. 285, 33 A.2d
178 (1943); Richards v. McAtee, 87 W. Va. 469, 105 S.E. 692 (1921); Melcher Lumber
Co. v. Gunderson, 192 Wis. 571, 213 N.W. 300 (1927).
20. Tasker v. Cochrane, 94 Cal. App. 361, 271 Pac. 503 (3d Dist. 1928); Fay Im•
provement Co. v. DeBudge, 52 Cal. App. 695, 199 Pac. 819 (1921); Daird v. Steadman,
39 Fla. 40, 21 So. 572 (1897); Rountree v. Simmons, 56 Ga. App. 678, 193 S.E. 787
(1937); Lothrop v. Duffield, 134 Mich. 485, 96 N.W. 577 (1903); Rhodes v. Frazier's
Estate, 204 S.W. 547 (Mo. App. 1918); Coxe v. Whitmore Motor Sales Co., 190 N.C. 838,
130 S.E. 841 (1925); Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N.D. 249, 83 N.W. 20 (1900); Sturgis v.
Sturgis, 51 Ore. 10, 93 Pac. 696 (1908); Miller v. Vervena, 69 R.I. 285, 33 A.2d 178
(1943); Andruss v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 888 (1901).
21. See Simes &: Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: II, 43
MICH. L. REv. 113 (1944).
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GUARDIAN'S EFFEGr ON ESTATE PLANS

Given this general background, it is the purpose of this comment
to explore the following questions:
(I) To what extent and under what circumstances may a guardian, with or without court approval, carry out or disturb the
plans expressed in his ward's will?
(2) To what extent and under what circumstances may he exercise the power reserved by a settlor, who has since become incompetent, to revoke, amend, or invade the corpus of a trust?
(3) To what extent and under what circumstances may he surrender for cash, change the beneficiary of, or alter the terms
of a life insurance policy?
Unfortunately, in most of the situations to be examined in this
comment, statutory treatment is lacking, and the case law is insufficient to give a clear answer to these questions. However, some observations and predictions are possible.
A. Wills

A will, usually the most important part of an estate plan, does
not become effective until the testator's death, and its existence may
be unknown to a guardian during the testator's life. Very often such
ignorap.ce on the part of the guardian will matter to no one, since
the role of the guardian is to act as a conservator of his ward's estate,
and purely conservative activity will generally have little effect upon
the disposition of property made by the will. However, when the
ward has made a specific devise of certain property by will and the
guardian finds it necessary to sell that property, the distribution plan
of the will is directly affected.
Normally, when a person prior to his death disposes of property
which he has specifically devised in his will, that gift is adeemed: the
will is revoked as to that particular devise. 22 Likewise, when it is
necessary for the guardian to sell certain of the ward's property before the ward's death, the fact that the property is the subject of a
specific devise does not affect the validity of the sale. This is true
regardless of whether the terms of the will are known to the guardian
or court, the theory being that the only proper concern of the guardian is the benefit of his ward. 23 When property which is the subject
22. In re Dungan, 31 Del. Ch. 551, 73 A.2d 776 (Super. Ct. 1950); Schildt v. Schildt,
201 Md. 10, 92 A.2d 367 (1952); In re Robinson, 139 Neb. 707, 298 N.W. 559 (1941);
Camden Trust Co. v. Cramer, 136 N.J. Eq. 261, 40 A.2d 601 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945);
In re Ossont, 208 Misc. 449, 143 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Surr Ct. 1955); In re Van Duyne, 205
Okla. 440, 239 P.2d 387 (1951); Blair v. Shannon, 349 Pa. 550, 37 A.2d 563 (1944);
6 PAGE, WILIS § 54.5 (rev. ed. 1962).
23. [T]he guardian of a person of unsound mind should, in the management of
his estate, attend solely and entirely to the interests of the owner, without looking
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of a specific devise is sold by a guardian, the courts are split on the
treatment to be accorded the intended heir. A majority hold that
since the ward, the incompetent, lacks the testamentary capacity to
change the will after the specifically devised property is sold, the
proceeds of that sale, to the extent they still exist in identifiable
form, will be substituted for the property.24 A minority treat a specific devise as adeemed in all cases where the property cannot be
found in the estate, on the theory that the courts have no power to
convert a specific devise into a general devise.25
Neither approach secures to the intended recipient of a specific
devise the property that the testator wanted him to receive. When
the terms of the will are unknown to the guardian and the supervising court, this is unfortunate but unavoidable. When the terms of a
will are known, however, the guardian has at least some opportunity
to preserve his ward's testamentary intention. Of course, if there is
no property left in the ward's estate except property subject to a specific devise, and the ward's income is insufficient to meet his expenses, the guardian has no choice but to sell the property. This is
only proper, and it may be assumed that the ward would have done
the same if he were competent. Normally, however, at the time it
becomes necessary to sell a part of the incompetent's estate, property
which is the subject of a specific devise will not be the only property
remaining. A question then arises as to which property to sell: that
which is the subject of a specific devise, or that which will pass
through a general devise? A strict rule that the court should direct
the sale of the generally devised property first will not suffice, since
the sale of such property will reduce the size of the estate going to
general heirs under the will. When a guardian needs to sell only a
small portion of a large estate, and his choice of property will have
the effect either of obliterating a small specific devise or merely reducing the residuary estate, the plan of the estate will clearly be least
upset by opting for the latter course. When the choice is between
two relatively equal pieces of property, however, one subject to a specific devise and the other constituting the major part of the residue
of the ward's estate, it is not at all clear which the ward would have
preferred to sell. In such a case, it seems to be entirely proper for
the guardian and court, since they are acting for the ward's benefit,
to inquire into the motives which prompted the ward to draw up
to the interest of those who, upon his death, may have eventual rights of sucsession.
WoERNER § 138, at 454.
24. Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542, 56 N.E.2d 619 (1944); In re Estate of Bierstedt, 254
Iowa 772, 119 N.W.2d 234 (1963); Walsh v. Gillespie, 338 Mass. 278, 154 N.E.2d 906
(1959); Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo. 506, 121 S.W.2d 852 (1938); Duncan v. Bigelow, 96
N.H. 216, 72 A.2d 497 (1950); In re Estate of Cooper, 95 N.J. Eq. 210, 123 Atl. 245
(Ct. Err. &: App. 1923); Bishop v. Fullmer, 112 Ohio App. 140, 175 N.E.2d 209 (1960).
25. In re Estate of Ireland, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931); In re Barrow's Estate,
103 Vt. 501, 156 Atl. 408 (1931).
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his will in the way that he did. Still other factors may also require
consideration. For example, the guardian may be faced with a choice
between selling high income property and low income property. If
the ward is expected to live for any great length of time, sale of the
low income property will benefit the ward more than sale of the high
income property, and may avoid complete exhaustion of the estate.
If the conflict between the directions of the ward's will and his
present personal need is called to the attention of the supervising
court, it is likely that the court will weigh the feasibility of maintaining the ward's testamentary purposes against the present benefit
to the ward in deciding what property shall be sold. Apparently, no
one acting merely to protect his interests as a prospective heir of an
incompetent has ever successfully challenged a judge's decision that
it was necessary to sell a particular piece of property. It is even possible that since the beneficiary named in a will is not considered to
have an interest in the property devised until the will takes effect,
he lacks the standing necessary to challenge such a decision. In any
event, these questions will not often arise, since a guardian is likely
to sell, and in some states must sell,26 personal property, which can
be done without court approval, before seeking a court's permission
to sell real estate.
The most direct way for a guardian to affect his ward's testamentary plans is, of course, to rewrite his ward's will. Rewriting a
will, however, does not seem to be a necessary part of the guardian's
role of providing for his ward's needs while alive, and court references to the rewriting of a will by a guardian uniformly state that
it is beyond the guardian's power. 27 Such references are dictum,
however, since there is no reported instance of a guardian attempting to rewrite a will.
The law of guardianship has largely ignored the effects on the
last will and testament of a ward resulting from the management
of the ward's property. This indifference should be carefully compared with the not entirely consistent treatment which some courts
have accorded other testamentary devices of the ward.

B.

Trusts

A modern estate plan is also likely to contain an inter vivas trust.
Unlike in a will, a person who creates a trust retains no more rights
in the trust than the instrument itself provides.28 Thus, if a ward
is the settlor of a trust his guardian certainly has no more power
26. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS .ANN. ch. 202, § 5 (1955); 1fi:. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
§ 2051 (1954); MICH. Cm,IP. LAws § 703.17 (1948); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 3A:16-4 (Supp.
1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2842 (1958).

27. See, e.g., In re Young Estate, 376 Mich. 106, 135 N.W.2d 417 (1965); Kay v.
Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932).
28. See .BOGERT, TRUSTS 8: TRUSTEES § 992 (2d ed. 1962); REsTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSJ'S § 380 (1959); 3 $COTT, TRUSTS § 330 (2d ed. 1956).
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with regard to the trust than that which the ward reserved for himself. It is settled that under a trust a guardian may enforce those
of his ward's rights which are of a non-discretionary nature, such as
a right to income.29 However, the settlor of a trust frequently reserves powers to revoke, amend, or invade a trust, and since these
powers are often of a strictly discretionary nature, it is questionable
whether a gu~rdian may exercise them.

I. The Totten Trust
The cases usually cited for the proposition that a guardian may
revoke a trust deal with savings account trusts30-commonly known
as Totten, or tentative, trusts.31 A Totten trust is created by depositing money in a savings account in the name of the depositor as
trustee for a third person. It is usually considered not to have created any absolute interest in the beneficiary until the depositor dies
or takes some affirmative action in addition to opening the account.32
Thus, the beneficiary of a Totten trust has no right to money which
the creator-depositor withdraws from the account during his lifetime.33 Since Totten trusts are sui generis, questions as to a guardian's power over Totten trust funds should be considered separately from the problems of other trust arrangements.
When the creator of a Totten trust becomes incompetent, his
guardian is uniformly permitted to use the bank account funds for
the ward's benefit.34 Some question might be raised as to the power
of courts to permit such action, since the court supervising the guardian frequently lacks jurisdiction over inter vivas trusts.35 However,
it is arguable that since the creator could have freely used these
funds had he remained competent, the courts, by permitting or
ordering the guardian to use the funds, are merely authorizing the
exercise of a power belonging to the ward.36
The decision of a guardianship court to permit the use of money
from a Totten trust fund is somewhat analogous to the sale of property specifically devised by will. In both cases the property is proper29. Witherington v. Nickerson, 256 Mass. 351, 152 N.E. 707 (1926); REsrATEMENT
(SECOND}, TRUSTS § 200 (1959).
30. E.g., Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P .2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942); Ganley v.
Lincoln Sav. Bank, 257 App. Div. 509, 13 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1939); In re Gross,
62 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1936); In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. &: C. 603 (C.P. 1952).
31. The Totten trust received its name from In the Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y.
Il2, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
32. See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS &: TRUSTEES § 47 (2d ed. 1965); REsrATEMENT
(SECOND}, TRUSTS § 58 (1959); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1956).
33. See In the Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
34. See, e.g., cases cited note 30 supra.
35. This was true, for example, in In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576,
2 N.W.2d 140 (1942).
36. See id. But see, In re Gross, 62 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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ty that the ward, if competent, would have been free to use had he so
desired, but which, if not so used, would have gone to a particular
beneficiary upon the ward's death. It is frequently said that in such
cases the court should direct the guardian "to act ... in accordance
with what the court finds would, in all probability, have been the
choice of the incompetent if he had been of sound mind."37 However, in practice, the guiding test applied by the courts for determining when a guardian may use Totten trust funds seems to be the
present need of the ward.38 The interest of the beneficiary in having
the Totten trust fund remain untouched is usually respected by the
court,39 but it is not sacrosanct.4° For example, in a case where there
was a choice between the sale of valuable real estate and use of
Totten trust funds to improve the real estate so that it would produce sufficient income to support the ward, a California appellate
court, over the objection of the trust beneficiary, ordered the probate court to consider using the Totten trust money. 41

2. The Inter Vivos Trust
The Totten trust is not likely to be found in a carefully workedout estate plan; 42 instead, careful planners tend to rely more heavily
on the traditional inter vivas trust device. When a ward has established an inter vivas trust prior to his incompetency, his remaining
estate will usually be sufficient to cover the expenses of a guardianship. If it is not, a question arises whether the guardian may exercise
a reserved power to invade or revoke the trust. It is clear that if the
settlor-ward were competent and needed the money for his own
necessities he would be free to exercise the reserved power to invade
the trust. It should follow, as in the case of the Totten trust, that
his guardian should also be able to exercise this power. In some
states, moreover, it is possible to advance another line of argument
to support invasion of the trust by the guardian. While the analogy
is somewhat imperfect, a guardian advancing expenses or incurring
personal debts subject to reimbursement from the ward's estate43
87. In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 583, 2 N.W. 2d 140, 144 (1942),
quoting In re Will of Hills, 264 N.Y. 849, 353, 191 N.E. 12, 13 (1934).
38. See cases cited note 30 supra.
39. See Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942). Cf. In re
Gross, 62 N.Y.S,2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
40. Compare In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. &: C. 603 (C.P. 1952) and Young v. Dollar Savings
Dank, 25 Pa. D. &: C. 80 (C.P. 1938), with Guardianship of Cuen note 39 supra.
41. Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P,2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
The probate court was ordered to consider, among other things, the life expectancy
of the ward in making its decision. Id. at 262, 298 P.2d at 547.
42, For examples of the problems attendant upon a Totten trust, see BOGERT, TRusrs
&: TRUSTEFS § 47 (2d ed. 1956).
48. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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may be compared to a creditor of the settler of a revocable trust.
Normally creditors of the settler cannot reach the trust property.44
However, in some states there are statutes which permit a creditor
to reach the trust property where a power of revocation has been
reserved. 45 In those states it might be argued that a guardian who has
advanced his own money for necessaries is sufficiently like a creditor
to permit him to reach the trust funds, even if he could not otherwise exercise the settler-ward's power of revocation. 46
In most states the jurisdiction over incompetents and the jurisdiction over inter vivos trusts are vested in different courts. 47 Any
attempt by a guardian to invade a trust created by his ward would
therefore probably require two judicial steps: the first in the guardianship court and the second in the court supervising the trust.
Assuming the guardian has the power to invade a trust created by
his ward, a question arises as to which of the two courts should
determine the necessity for the invasion. The guardianship court
might make this determination, with the expectation that its decision
would be respected by the court with jurisdiction over the trust,
on the theory that it alone has the power to make decisions on
behalf of its settler-ward. However, unlike Totten trusts or wills,
beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust who are not presently entitled
to benefits may, in some limited instances, be empowered to seek
enforcement of the trust.48 Certainly, any beneficiary of the trust
who had not participated in the guardianship court proceedings
could urge the court with jurisdiction over the trust to reconsider
the need to invade the trust. Moreover, equity courts supervising
trusts have always asserted the power to vary the terms of a trust
after a change in circumstances, in order to carry out the settler's
purpose; 49 the incompetency of the settler might be considered to
be such a change of circumstance.
44. In the absence of fraud or a statute to the contrary it has been held that the
settlor's creditors cannot reach the trust property directly, nor can they compel the
settlor to exercise the power of revocation. Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 33
A.2d 16 (1943); see 3 Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956).
45. E.g., Ar.A. CODE tit. 47, § 75 (1958); IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-610 (Burns, 1961);
MicH. COMP. LA.ws § 556.14 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.76 (1947); N.Y. REAL PROP,
LAw § 139 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-05-35 (1960); OKLA. STAT, tit. 60, § 267
(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 231.51 (1957).
46. Cf. In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. & C. 603 (C.P. 1952).
47. See notes 22 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
48. The textwriters broadly assert that any beneficiary of an inter vivos trust may
enforce the trust. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSI'EES § 963 (2d ed. 1962); R.EsTATEMENT (SEC·
OND), TRUSTS § 172, comment c (1959); 2 Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 172 (2d ed. 1956). However,
in many states one who is not a present beneficiary of the trust may bring an action
for enforcement only if he alleges active mismanagement. See Note, 65 l\IICH. L. REv.
981 (1967). Nevertheless, even the existence of this limited right might lead a trustee
to resist invasion of a trust more vigorously.
49. Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 255 Mich. 436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931); Bennett v.
Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 s.w. 840 (1912); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 168 (1959).
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There is apparently no reported case in which a guardian, seeking to exercise the settlor-ward's power of invasion or revocation,
has actually appeared in a court with jurisdiction over the trust.
However, at least one case has held that a court supervising a guardian may order the guardian to exercise his ward's power to invade
a trust. In 1'.1atter of Norris, 50 a resident of New York had established
a trust in Massachusetts which by its terms reserved to the settlor a
power of invasion. The settlor was later adjudged incompetent and
her son was appointed as her guardian. The son petitioned a New
York court for an order to invade the trust in the amount of $5,000,
claiming that the money was necessary to meet the expenses of the
settlor. The New York Supreme Court, in Special Term, while conceding the power of Massachusetts to make a final determination of
whether the power of invasion was purely personal to the settlor,
held that since it had jurisdiction over the settlor's affairs while she
was incompetent, "any property election of this description which
the donor could exercise had she remained of sound mind may now
be made on her behalf and in her interest by this court." 51 The court
ordered the son to exercise the power of invasion and bring suit in
Massachusetts if necessary to do so. It should be noted that in New
York the jurisdiction over mental incompetents is vested in the
Supreme Court, 52 a court of general jurisdiction,53 rather than in a
court of probate jurisdiction, as in most states.54 Arguably, however,
even if a court has jurisdiction only over an incompetent's affairs
the reasoning of the Norris case would still seem to be applicable,
because the court, despite its general jurisdiction, did not have jurisdiction over the trust in question. Nevertheless, in a state where
the authority of courts of limited jurisdiction is narrowly construed
the result might be different.
On a subsequent appeal, the Norris case was remanded with instructions to determine whether an allowance being paid to the son,
an adult, was a necessary expense of the settlor's estate. 55 This instruction raises the question of the standards to be applied in determining whether to invade a trust. The lower court had said that it
would "try, so far as reasonably practicable, to put itself in the position of the donor, and to determine what she would likely have done
or would be reasonably apt to do had she remained of sound mind." 56
The court in effect was saying that it would disturb the ward's earlier plans as little as possible, since the ward had never really ex50. 180 Misc. 361, 41 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem. 266 App. Div. 882, 42
N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1943).
51. 180 Misc. at 363, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
52. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW§ 100.
53. N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 1.
54. See note 22 supra.
55. Matter of Norris, 266 App. Div. 882, 42 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1943~.
56. 180 Misc. at 363, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
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pressed any intention as to what should be done under these
circumstances. In practice, a guardian probably would not go to the
trouble of attempting to invade a trust until other sources of income
for the ward are exhausted. This is probably all to the good: waiting
until other sources of income have been exhausted would probably
least upset the settlor's estate plan, since an inter vivos trust is likely
to contain the most important provisions of the plan. This thinking
was implicit in the appellate court's approach to the Norris case, in
which the court, in deciding whether it was necessary to invade the
trust, looked first to see if the expenses of the ward's estate could
be reduced by eliminating unnecessary expenditures. 57
The settlor may also reserve to himself a power to amend the
trust, which, unlike powers of invasion or revocation, may be used
directly to change the trust's dispositive provisions. In this respect,
amending a trust is very much like rewriting a will, and the undisputed assumption that a guardian cannot rewrite a will for his ward
argues for the conclusion that a guardian may not use a power of
amendment to change dispositive provisions of. a trust created by
his ward. 58 On the other hand, it is arguable that the power to revoke or amend a trust includes within it the power to amend, 59 and
if the guardian, under court direction, may exercise a power of his
ward to revoke or invade a trust, as discussed above, it would seem
that he should be able to use the lesser power of amendment to
revoke a part of the trust for his ward's present needs.
Finally, it should be noted that a power of invasion may be given
to a person other than the settlor of a trust. When such a power has
been given to a beneficiary who subsequently becomes incompetent,
it is largely a question of the settlor's intent as to whether the beneficiary's guardian may exercise the power. If the settlor was relying
upon the personal judgment of the holder of the power, then no one
else, including a guardian or a court, should be able to exercise that
judgment.(1° If the power of invasion has been conditioned upon a
showing of the beneficiary's necessity, however, and by this the settlor intended to secure the beneficiary's needs, it seems that a guardian, upon a showing of such necessity, should be able to exercise
that power. When a beneficiary has been given an unconditional
power of invasion, it is possible that the settlor was relying on the
personal judgment of the beneficiary, but it is not unreasonable that
the settlor also intended to secure the beneficiary's needs. Thus in
57. 266 App. Div. at 883, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (1943).
58. See note 27 supra.
59. The question of whether a power to amend a trust includes the power to
revoke is basically one of interpretation of the trust instrument. See 3 Scon, TRusrs
§ 331.2 (2d ed. 1956).
60. See In the Mat~r of Es~te of G~nt, 122 Misc. 491, 204 N.Y. Supp. 238 (Surr.
1924).
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a case where all of ·a beneficiary's personal resources have been exhausted it may be justifiable to permit a guardian to exercise the
beneficiary's unconditional power of invasion. This question of
whether the power is considered personal or not would clearly be
in the hands of the court supervising the trust, not the guardianship
court, since it involves a question of determining whether the purpose of the trust is being carried out.
C. Life Insurance

Insurance may also play an important part in the planning of
an estate, and there are a number of attributes of life insurance
which may be important to the guardian of an incompetent. If, for
example, the ward's insurance policy does not provide that payment
of premiums ceases upon disability of the policyholder, the guardian
must decide whether to continue to pay the premiums. If he decides
not to do so, he may be faced with a number of additional options,
such as t~king a paid-up policy with a lesser face value, or taking
term insurance in the full face amount of the old policy. Where the
ward, if he was competent, would have been able to elect from
among such options upon non-payment of premiums, the guardian
may exercise the same discretion under court direction.61 Moreover,
a guardian may surrender the policy for its cash value, or borrow
against the cash value of the policy without court direction, and is
subject to liability for so doing only if he has not acted with due
regard to his ward's interests. 62 The guardian may likewise exchange
the policy for one of less value in order to stop the accumulation of
interest on a loan made by the insurance company to the ward before
the ward became incompetent. 63 It should be noted that if the life
insurance policy is part of an estate plan and payment to the beneficiary is in lieu of, or in addition to, a bequest under the ward's
will, any of the above actions by a guardian may have the same effect
as the sale of an item which has been specifically devised under a
will. Yet courts have given little thought to the interest of the beneficiary when considering the guardian's use of life insurance funds.64
Finally, a policyholder usually has the right to change the beneficiary of a policy. Such a change has much the same effect as rewriting a will. This analogy has impressed several courts as the primary
reason for refusing to permit a guardian, acting with or without
61. Pendas v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 129 Fla. 253, 176 So. 104 (1938). Court
approval may not always be necessary. See Latterman v. Guardian Life Assur. Co., 280
N.Y. 102, 19 N.E.2d 978 (1939). See also Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1063 (1937), supplemented
by 127 A.L.R. 454 (1940), and 136 A.L.R. 1045 (1942).
62. Maclay v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 152 U. S. 499 (1894:). Cf. Kay v. Erickson,
209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932).
63. Ibid.
6·1. See Maclay v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 152 U.S. 499 (1894); Kay v. Erickson,
209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932).
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court direction, to change the beneficiary. 65 There is an additional
reason given for denying the guardian this power: the role of a guardian is restricted to actions taken for the present benefit of the ward,
and the ward derives no present benefit from a change in the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. 66 However, at least one court has
ordered the guardian of an incompetent to make such a change. 67
There the ward, prior to becoming incompetent, had taken out two
policies naming his wife as beneficiary. When the ward became insane, his wife had their marriage annulled, after which the guardian
petitioned the court for an order to make the ward's estate the beneficiary of the policies in place of the ex-wife. All interested parties,
the ward, the guardian, the ex-wife, and the insurance company,
were before the court. Relying on a statute authorizing the chancellor to direct the guardian to exercise any power of the incompetent, 68 the court said that it would "do that which it is reasonable
to belief the lunatic himself would do if he had the capacity to act." 00
The chancellor, after examining the ward in court, granted the guardian's petition and ordered the change of beneficiary, giving several
reasons for his decision. First, he found that the ex-wife had severed
all connections with the ward and that he could have defeated her
interest in the policies had he not been incompetent. Second, the
same result could have been accomplished more directly by surrendering the policies for their cash value. Third, after the change the
proceeds, when paid, would first be applied to the expenses of the
ward's last illness and burial, and the remainder would pass intestate
to his brothers and sister, who were caring for him. Finally, if the
ward regained his sanity he could change the beneficiary at any time
he wished.
The court made no reference to the ward's present needs. This
approach is difficult to reconcile with both the notion that the guardian's role is limited to providing for his ward's present needs and
65. E.g., In re Young Estate, 376 Mich. 106, 135 N.W.2d 417 (1965); In re Sellers,
154 Ohio St. 483, 96 N.E.2d 595 (1951); Kay v. Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625
(1932).
66. In re Young Estate, supra note 65.
67. In re Degnan, 122 N.J. Eq. 470, 194 Atl. 789 (1937).
68. Where any power, discretionary or otherwise, is or shall be vested in or given
to, or the exercise of any power is or ~hall be dependent. up_on the c?nsent of. ~ny
idiot, lunatic or person of unsound mmd, upon the application by bill or petition
of the gnardian of any such idiot, lunatic, or peyson of unsound. mind, or of any
person intere~ted, the_ court of chance!)' may, 1f 1t_ appears expedient so to do, by
order authonze or duect such guardian to exerose such power or execute such
consent in manner and form as shall be directed by said court, and any and every
conveyance or other instrument made and executed by such guardian pursuant
to such order, shall be as valid and effective as though duly made and executed
by such idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind when of sound mind, memory
and understanding.
N.J. COMP. STATS. p. 2792, § 14j (1910). The present version of this statute has not
been materially changed. N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:22-l (1952).
69. In re Degnan, 122 N.J. Eq. 470, 473, 194 Atl. 789, 791 (Ch. 1937), quoting Potter
v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1895).
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the rule that a guardian may not directly change a dispositive plan.
The court's primary reason for changing the beneficiary was that,
under the circumstances, the ward could no longer reasonably desire
that his ex-wife remain the object of his bounty.70 It is difficult to
see why this reasoning would not permit a court to order a change
in an incompetent's will or trust if the ward's desires were sufficiently
apparent or inferable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The duty of a guardian is to provide for his ward's needs and
conserve his ward's estate. Normally, conscientious fulfillment of
this duty will serve the interest of both the incompetent and his
prospective heirs, since the heirs are also interested in retaining as
large an estate as possible. Frequently, however, medical bills or the
expenses of institutional care for the aging incompetent may require
the guardian to dip heavily into his ward's estate. Several factors
will determine which property the guardian may choose to sell first.
Since the guardian has the duty to produce income,71 high income
property is unlikely to be sold first. He is also unlikely to sell property, such as real estate, for which he must go to the trouble of
obtaining court approval. Moreover, if the guardian happens to be
the beneficiary of the ward's life insurance policy, or if he is in line
to receive particular property under the ward's will, he will not be
inclined to cash in the insurance or sell such property first. If the
guardian finds it necessary either to sell real estate or to invade a
trust, both of which require court approval, the sale of real estate
would probably be the most convenient choice administratively, in
view of the uncertainty of the law surrounding the invasion of a
trust. Thus, using administrative convenience as the standard, a
rough order of priority for the liquidation of an incompetent's
estate may be established as follows: first, personal property, second,
life insurance funds, third, real estate, and finally, trust funds. It
should be readily apparent that any correspondence between administrative convenience in selling property and the desires of the ward,
as expressed in his estate plans, is purely fortuitous.
A supervising court is likely to consider the ward's estate plans,
if it knows about them. However, since the guardian has no duty
to take his ward's estate plans into consideration,72 he may have
already upset these plans before the problem ever reaches a court.
As the law presently stands, the priorities of liquidation may in
practice give preferential treatment to certain types of estate arrange'70. In re Degnan, 122 N.J. Eq. 4'70, 4'73-'74, 194 Atl. '789, '791 (Ch. 1937).
'71. See authorities cited note 12 supra.
'72.

WOERNER §

138, at 454.
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ments.73 For example, it is much more difficult for the guardian to
make use of property which would pass to the beneficiaries of a trust
than property which would pass by will or life insurance. Similarly,
the interest of general legatees under a ward's will is not as likely
to be consumed completely by a guardianship as is the interest of a
person who is to receive specific property under the terms of the will.
Guardians and the courts which supervise them are supposed to
act in the best interests of their wards. In practice, they act merely
to provide for their wards' immediate needs, without regard to
longer range considerations. In the case of a minor this is probably
sufficient, but one of the greatest present concerns to an aged ward
is what will happen to his property when he dies. There is no reason
under present law for a judge not to review, either on his own initiative or at the request of a prospective heir or the guardian, the
condition of the ward's assets and the nature of his estate plan in
order to set guidelines for the administration of the estate which
would be responsive to both the present interests of the ward and
the longer range requirements of his estate plan.
A recent case illustrates what a forward-looking court may accomplish in promoting both the present interests of the ward and the
interests of his prospective heirs. Under the doctrine of substituted
judgment some courts have recognized that distributions out of surplus income may, in proper circumstances, be made to needy relatives.74 In such a case, the court purports to act as it is probable the
ward would have acted if he were of sound mind. 75 In a recent
decision of the California District Court of Appeals, Guardianship
of Christiansen,16 this doctrine was broadened to permit distribution
of a part of the principle to prospective heirs of the incompetent
for the purpose of avoiding estate taxes. The court in Christiansen
rejected the probate court's argument that the limited statutory
authorization for the doctrine of substituted judgment77 precluded
a probate court from making such a distribution. Instead, the appellate court read two prior decisions of the California Supreme Court
to mean that the statutory powers of the probate court merely supplement its inherent equity powers in the administration of an
73. See Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942); Ganley v.
Lincoln Sav• .Bank, 257 App. Div. 509, 13 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1939); Matter of
Norris, 180 Misc. 361, 41 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affd mem., 266 App. Div. 882,
42 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1943); In re Gross, 62 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1936); In re
Derr, 83 Pa. D. 8: C. 603 (C.P. 1952).
74. This doctrine was enunciated by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Merivale
99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). For cases in which it has been used, see, e.g., In re
Johnson, 111 N.J. Eq. 268, 162 Atl. 96 (Ch. 1932); Matter of Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162
N.E. 471 (1928).
75. Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P,2d 805 (1941).
76. 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
77. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1558.
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incompetent's estate.78 The court also found a trend in other jurisdictions toward permitting payments out of principle to needy relatives, provided adequate provision had already been made for the
ward.70 The court said that in determining whether payments out
of principle should be made, "the guardian should be authorized to
act as a reasonable and prudent man would act under the same circumstances, unless there is evidence of any settled intention of the
incompetent, formed while sane, to the contrary." 89 Rejecting the
argument that it could not act for the benefit of prospective heirs,
the court went on to say the following:
To refuse to permit the management of the incompetent's estate in
the manner that a reasonable and prudent man would manage his
estate may, in many cases, lead to the improbable conclusion that it
was the intent of the incompetent to enrich the taxing authorities
rather than the natural or declared objects of his bounty.81
Concluding that a reasonable man in planning his estate might make
gifts in order to avoid unnecessary estate or inheritance taxes or
expenses of administration, the court remanded the case to the probate court, listing four points that should be considered in determining whether to authorize the payments to prospective heirs.
The first point is that when the incompetent's condition is not
permanent, payments are justifiable only as a continuation of the
ward's practices or plans prior to incompetency.82 The second point
is that the distribution of principle should be permitted only to the
extent that the remaining sum will produce sufficient income to
meet the ward's probable maximum expenses. 83 The third is that
the gifts should conform, as nearly as possible, to the devolution of
property which would take place, either by will or intestacy, upon
the incompetent's death, although the prospective heirs might, by
waiver, vary this order.84 Finally, the California court required some
showing of the kind of relationship and intimacy which would have
made the prospective donees the object of the ward's bounty had
the ward been competent.85
A foresighted estate planner could avoid the problems of a guardianship by laying plans against possible incompetency which eliminate altogether the need to appoint a guardian. For example, when
78. Guardianship of Hall, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947); Harris v. Harris,
57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481 (1962).
79. In re DuPont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1963); In re Guardianship of
Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19
N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
80. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
81. Id. at 522.
82. Id. at 523.
83. Ibid.
84. Id. at 524.
85. Ibid.
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an inter vivas trust is established, special instructions to be followed
by the trustee in case the settlor becomes incompetent could very
easily eliminate entirely the need for a guardian of the settlor's
estate. A trustee, with his more flexible powers,86 would be able to
administer the assets under his control for the settlor's benefit much
more efficiently than a guardian. Unfortunately, most persons do
not plan for incompetency, and in many states the only recourse is
to a guardianship, with its restricted powers. Long overdue legislative action clarifying the powers of guardians and making guardians
more flexible may perhaps be the answer to many of the problems
raised herein. 87
George T. Stevenson
86. See text accompanying notes 7, 13, and 21 supra.
87. For a discussion of guardianship provisions of the proposed Uniform Probate
Code, see Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 983
(1966).

